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Abstract
In the network creation game with n vertices, every vertex (a
player) buys a set of adjacent edges, each at a fixed amount α > 0.
It has been conjectured that for α ≥ n, every Nash equilibrium is a
tree, and has been confirmed for every α ≥ 273 · n. We improve upon
this bound and show that this is true for every α ≥ 65 · n. To show
this, we provide new and improved results on the local structure of
Nash equilibria. Technically, we show that if there is a cycle in a Nash
equilibrium, then α < 65 · n. Proving this, we only consider relatively
simple strategy changes of the players involved in the cycle. We further
show that this simple approach cannot be used to show the desired up-
per bound α < n (for which a cycle may exist), but conjecture that a
slightly worse bound α < 1.3 · n can be achieved with this approach.
Towards this conjecture, we show that if a Nash equilibrium has a cy-
cle of length at most 10, then indeed α < 1.3 · n. We further provide
experimental evidence suggesting that when the girth of a Nash equi-
librium is increasing, the upper bound on α obtained by the simple
strategy changes is not increasing. To the end, we investigate the ap-
proach for a coalitional variant of Nash equilibrium, where coalitions
of two players cannot collectively improve, and show that if α ≥ 41 ·n,
then every such Nash equilibrium is a tree.
1 Introduction
Network creation game has been introduced by Fabrikant et al. [8] as a formal
model to study the effects of strategic decisions of economically motivated
agents in decentralized networks such as the Internet. In such networks, local
decisions including those about infrastructure are decided by autonomous
systems. Autonomous systems follow their own interest, and as a result,
their decisions may be sub-optimal for the whole society. Network creation
games allow to formally study the structure of networks created in such a
manner, and to compare them with potentially optimal networks (optimal
with respect to the whole society).
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In the network creation game, there are n players V = {1, . . . , n}, each
representing a vertex of an undirected graph. The strategy si of a player i
is to create (or buy) a set of adjacent edges, each at a fixed amount α > 0.
The played strategies s = (s1, . . . , sn) collectively define an edge-set Es,
and thus a graph Gs = (V,Es). The goal of every player is to minimize
its cost ci, which is the amount paid for the edges (creation cost), plus the
total distances of the player to every other node of the resulting network G
(usage cost), i.e.,
ci(s) = α · |si|+
n∑
j=1
dist(i, j),
where dist(i, j) denotes the distance between i and j in the resulting network
G.
A strategy vector s = (s1, . . . , sn) is a Nash equilibrium if no player i
can change the set si of created edges to another set s
′
i and improve its cost
ci. Abusing the definition, the resulting graph Gs itself is called a Nash
equilibrium, too, and we define its (social) cost c(G) to be the cost c(s),
i.e., the cost of the corresponding strategy vector s. The social cost c(s) of
strategy vector s is the sum of the individual costs, i.e., c(s) =
∑n
i=1 ci(s).
It is a trivial observation to see that in any Nash equilibrium Gs, no edge
is bought more than once. From now on, we only consider such strategy
vectors, and observe then that
c(s) :=
n∑
i=1
ci(s) = α · |Es|+
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
d(i, j).
A graph G = (V,E) can be created by many strategy vectors s (precisely
in 2|E| many ways, because every edge in E can be bought by exactly one of
its endpoints), but each of such realizations has the same social cost. Graph
G∗ = (V,E) is an optimum graph, if it minimizes the social cost c(s) (for
any strategy vector s for which Gs = G).
Let N denote the set of all Nash equilibria of a network creation game
on n vertices and edge-price α. The price of anarchy (PoA) of the network
creation game is the ratio
PoA = max
s∈N
c(Gs)
c(G∗)
.
Price of anarchy expresses the (worst-case) loss of the quality of a network
that the society could achieve.
In a series of papers [8, 1, 6, 9] it has been shown that the price of anarchy
of the network creation game is O(1), i.e., a constant independent of both
n and α, for every value α > 0 with the exception of the range n1−ε < α <
273 · n, where ε = Ω( 1logn). For the value of α with n
1−ε < α < 273 · n,
an upper bound of 2
n
√
logn on the price of anarchy is known (while no Nash
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equilibrium with considerably large social cost is known). It is conjectured,
however, that the price of anarchy is constant also in this range of α. It
remains a major open problem to confirm or disprove this conjecture. It is
certainly of interest to note that there are several variants of the network
creation game (see, e.g., [2, 4, 7, 3]), but in none of these, with the exception
of [5], the price of anarchy could be shown to be constant.
Understanding the structure of Nash equilibria has proven to be impor-
tant in bounding the price of anarchy. Fabrikant et al. [8] showed that the so-
cial cost of any tree G in Nash equilibrium is upper-bounded by O(1) ·c(G∗).
Therefore, the price of anarchy is O(1) for all values of α for which every
Nash equilibrium is a tree. It has been shown that every Nash equilibrium
is a tree for all values of α greater than n2, 12n log n, and 273n, respectively,
in [8],[1], and [9]. It has been conjectured that every Nash equilibrium is a
tree for every α ≥ n. Since for α = n/2, non-tree Nash equilibria are known,
this tree conjecture is asymptotically tight.
In this paper, we make steps in the direction of resolving the tree con-
jecture. We first tighten the tree conjecture and provide a construction
of a non-tree Nash equilibrium for every α = n − 3 (thus, showing that,
asymptotically, one cannot hope to show that every Nash equilibrium is a
tree for some value α < n). We then apply a “linear-programming-like”
approach to show that for α ≥ 65n, every Nash equilibrium is a tree. To
show this, we obtain new structural results on Nash equilibria and combine
them with the previous approach of [9]. Towards the end, we make further
steps towards the conjecture. We show that if α ≥ n, then there is no
non-tree Nash equilibrium containing exactly one cycle. We then apply the
“linear-programming-like” approach again to show that the girth of every
non-tree Nash equilibrium (for any α ≥ n) is at least 6. Using the same
ideas, we show that if a non-tree Nash equilibrium has girth at most 10,
then α ≤ 1.3n. By further experimental results, we conjecture that this
holds for any girth, i.e., that non-tree Nash equilibria can appear only for
α ≤ 1.3n.
2 Preliminaries
In the following, we will often denote the considered Nash equilibrium graph
Gs = (V,Es) of a network creation game with α > 0 simply as G = (V,E).
Even though the graph Gs is undirected, we will often direct the edges to
express the identity of the player which bought the edge in s; An edge {u, v}
directed from u to v denotes the fact that u bought/created the edge in s.
Every non-tree G contains a cycle. Let c be the length of a shortest cycle
C in G, and let a0, a1, . . . , ac−1 be the players that form one such shortest
cycle, and where {ai, ai+1} ∈ E for every i = 0, 1, . . . , c − 1 (where indices
on vertices of the cycle are in the whole paper to be understood modulo c).
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Observe the crucial property of a shortest cycle C: the distance between ai
and aj in the graph G is equal to the distance between ai and aj on the
cycle C.
We will consider the players on the cycle C and their strategy-changes
that involve only the c edges of the cycle. For each strategy-change s′ai
of player ai, we obtain an inequality ci(s) ≤ ci(s1, . . . , s′ai , . . . , sn) stating
simply the fact that in a Nash equilibrium s, player ai cannot improve by
changing its strategy. We will often express such an inequality in the form
of “SAVINGS” ≤ “INCREASE”, where “SAVINGS” denotes the parts of
ci(s) that decreased their value in ci(s
′), and “INCREASE” denotes the
parts of ci(s) that increased their value in ci(s
′). For example, assume
that ai buys the edge e = {ai, ai+1} (i.e., e ∈ si), and let us consider the
strategy change where ai deletes the edge e (i.e., s
′
i = si \ {e}). Recall
that ci(s) = α · |si| +
∑
j d(i, j). Then, in such a strategy change, the
“SAVINGS” are clearly on the edge-creation side, i.e., the player ai saves α
for not paying for the edge e. At the same time, some distances of player
i may have increased – the distance to a vertex v increases, if in Gs every
shortest path from ai to v uses the deleted edge e. But the distance to v
could have increased by at most c − 2 (as before, ai needed to go to vertex
ai+1 but now the vertex ai+1 can be reached “around” the cycle). Because of
the Nash equilibrium property of s, we have “SAVINGS” ≤ “INCREASE”,
which implies α ≤ (c − 2)(n − 1) (as the distance to at most n− 1 vertices
could have increased).
In the following, we will use slightly more involved forms of the just
described inequalities. For that reason, we will partition the vertices ac-
cording to their distances to the vertices from the cycle. Let us fix a vertex
v ∈ V . Let G \ C be the graph G without the c edges of the cycle C. Let
us denote the distances of v to the vertices a0, a1, . . . , ac−1 in G \ C by the
vector d(v) = (d0, d1, . . . , dc−1), respectively, where di = ∞ if ai and v are
disconnected in G \ C. We call di the outer distance of v to ai in the Nash
equilibrium G, and d the vector of outer distances of v in G. We now parti-
tion the vertices of V by this vector of outer distances. We will coarsen the
partition in the following way. Observe that ds(ai, v) in Gs is now equal to
minj(ds(ai, aj)+dj), because there always is a shortest path from ai to v that
first uses a part of the cycle C (until vertex aj), leaves C and never comes
back to C. Therefore, minj dj ≤ ds(ai, v) ≤ (c−1)+minj dj). Moreover, for
any strategy change s′i of player ai which leaves ai connected by an edge to
a vertex of C, we still have minj dj ≤ ds′(ai, v) ≤ (c− 1) +minj dj (because
there is a path from ai to the vertex aj of smallest entry dj using the edge
and the remaining of the cycle). Because we are interested in the changes of
the distances from ai, i.e., in the value of ∆ := ds′(ai, v) − ds(ai, v), we can
normalize the vector d(v) by subtracting minj dj from each of the elements
d0, d1, . . . , dc−1 (which does not change the value of ∆). Observe that after
the normalization, there is an entry di equal to zero. We will “normalize”
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Figure 1: Non-tree Nash equilibrium for n = 2s + 3 players and α = n − 3.
An edge directed from a node u to a node v denotes that u buys the edge.
the entries further more. Since we are interested in the value ∆, we can han-
dle all entries dj ≥ c − 1 in the same way: they do not have any influence
on ∆ at all (no shortest path from vertex ai, i 6= j, will ever use aj to reach
vertex v). We will therefore further modify the vector d by substituting
every entry dj ≥ c− 1 with the value c− 1.
This gives partition of all vertices into groups Vd, where each group
has associated vector of “normalized” outer distances d = (d0, · · · , dc−1),
one of the distances is necessarily equal to 0 and all the distances are upper
bounded by c−1. Vertices which have vector of outer distances d′ containing
numbers greater than c − 1 are associated with the group having a vector
d′′ obtained from d′ where all entries greater than c − 1 are changed to
c − 1. In this way, there are t = cc − (c − 1)c groups. We denote the set
of all “normalized” distance vectors by D. Trivially, as Vd, d ∈ D, form a
partition of V ,
∑
d∈D |Vd| = n.
3 Bounds on α for existence of cycles
We first give in Fig. 1 a construction of a non-tree Nash equilibrium graph
for n = 2s + 3 vertices, and α = 2s = n − 3, for any integer s. This thus
shows that the conjecture “for α ≥ n, all Nash equilibria are trees” cannot
be improved to “for α ≥ (1 − ε)n, all Nash equilibria are trees”. We now
proceed and give a lower bound on the length of a shortest cycle in any Nash
equilibrium.
Theorem 1 The length c of a shortest cycle C in any Nash equilibrium is
at least 2α
n
+ 2.
Proof. We distinguish two cases. First, assume that there is a player,
which buys both its adjacent edges on the cycle C. Without loss of generality
assume that this player is a0. Consider the strategy change where a0 deletes
both these edges {a0, a1} and {a0, ac−1} and buys an edge towards player
ai on the cycle, i = 2, . . . , c − 2. The player cannot improve by such a
change, and therefore “SAVINGS” ≤ “INCREASE”. Here, the player saves
at least α (by buying one edge less). Let us denote the increase of distances
of player a0 to the players of the group Vd by ci,d. Then we get that α ≤
5
∑
d∈D δi,d|Vd|. Summing up all the c− 3 inequalities, one for every i, we get
(c− 3)α ≤
∑c−2
i=2
∑
d δi,d|Vd|.
We now show that for every d, the coefficient
∑
i δi,d at |Vd| is at most
(c − 2)(c − 3)/2. Consider arbitrary d = (d0, d1, . . . , dc−1) of the outer
distances of the vertices in Vd. Clearly, the strategy change of a0 increases its
distances to Vd iff every shortest path from a0 to Vd goes through the deleted
edges. Thus, we can assume (for the worst-case) that d0 = c − 1. Assume
that one shortest path (in Gs) leaves the cycle at ae, e ∈ {1, . . . , c− 2}. In
the new graph Gs′ , player a0 can always use the new edge {a0, ai} and then
go to ae on the remainder of the cycle C. Thus, the increase of distances δi,d
is at most (1+|i−e|)−1 = |i−e|. In total, we obtain
∑c−2
i=2 δi,d ≤
∑
i |i−e| ≤∑
i(i − 1) = (c − 3)(c − 2)/2, as claimed. Now, since
∑
d∈D |Vd| = n, we
finally get that α ≤ (c−2)2 n, which gives the claimed c ≥
2α
n
+ 2.
Consider now the second case where no player buys two of its adjacent
edges in C, i.e., every player buys exactly one edge. Without loss of gener-
ality assume that every player ai buys the edge {ai, ai+1}. For each player
i, we consider the strategy change of deleting the edge {ai, ai+1}. Similarly
to the previous case, we obtain α ≤
∑
d∈D δi,d|Vd|. Summing for every i, we
get cα ≤
∑c−1
i=0
∑
d δi,d|Vd|. We show this time that
∑c−1
i=0 δi,d, the coefficient
at |Vd|, is upper bounded by 1+2+ · · ·+(c−2) = (c−2)(c−1)/2. Consider
an arbitrary d = (d0, . . . , dc−1) ∈ D, and assume without loss of generality
that d0 = 0. For every player ai, δi,d is at most i−1, because the worst-case
increase in a distance of player ai to vertices Vd happens when all shortest
paths from ai used the deleted edge {ai, ai+1}. But because after the dele-
tion, there is an alternative path from ai to Vd using a0, the increase is at
most i− 1. Thus, summing over all i, the total increase in distances to Vd is
at most 0+ 1+2+ · · ·+(c− 2) = (c− 2)(c− 1)/2 as claimed. Plugging this
into our inequality, cα ≤
∑
i
∑
d δi,d|Vd| and using the fact that
∑
d |Vd| = n,
we obtain that c > 2α
n
+ 2.

Let H be a non-trivial biconnected component of a non-tree Nash equi-
librium, i.e., an induced subgraph of H of at least three vertices containing
no bridge. For any vertex v ∈ H, let S(v) be the set of vertices which do
not belong to H, and which have v as the closest vertex among all vertices
in H. For any vertex u ∈ H, we define degH(u) to be the degree of vertex
u in the graph induced by H. Furthermore, we define Nk(u) to be the k-th
neighborhood of u in H, i.e., Nk(u) := {w ∈ H | d(u,w) ≤ k}. The following
lemma has been shown in [9]. We will use it to prove the subsequent lemma.
Lemma 1 ([9]) If u, v ∈ V (H) are two vertices in H with d(u, v) ≥ 3 such
that u buys the edge to its adjacent vertex x in a shortest u − v-path and
v buys the edge to its adjacent vertex y in that path, then degH(x) ≥ 3 or
degH(y) ≥ 3.
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Figure 2: The 5-Neighborhood N5(u) of vertex u.
Lemma 2 If H is a biconnected component of G, then for any vertex u, its
neighborhood N5(u) in H contains a vertex v with degH(v) ≥ 3.
Proof. Assume that this is not true. Then the 5-neighborhood N5(u) of
vertex u is formed by two disjoint paths. (The case that the 5-neighborhood
forms a cycle is excluded by Proposition 1 stating that no Nash equilibrium
for α > n contains exactly one cycle). We consider two cases. First, we will
assume that at least one of the two paths starting at u is directed away from
u (see Fig. 2(a)). In the second case, in each of the two paths, there has to
be a vertex which buys an edge towards u. It follows from Lemma 1 that
these two vertices are the two neighbors of u in N5(u) (see Fig. 2(b)).
In the first case, there is a sequence of five edges directed away from u,
with the naming like in Fig. 2(a)). Let su := |S(u)|, si = |S(i)| for 0 ≤ i ≤ 4.
Then,
s0 ≥ s1 + s2 + s3 + s4, s1 ≥ s2 + s3 + s4, s2 ≥ s3 + s4, s3 ≥ s4, s4 ≥ k, (1)
where k is the number of vertices which are descendants of vertex 5 in the
breadth-first-search (BFS) tree rooted at vertex 3. We can obtain these
inequalities by considering the following strategy changes of the players u
and i, 0 ≤ i ≤ 3: delete the edge directed away from u, and buy a new edge
to the next vertex in the sequence; now simply apply the “SAVINGS” ≤
“INCREASE” principle.
We first assume that vertex 5, the neighbor of vertex 4 in H, has degree
at least 3 in H (i.e., it has at least two children in the BFS tree rooted at
vertex 3). The case when the degree-3 vertex appears later along the path
is easier and will be discussed later. We now distinguish two cases. First,
we assume that one of the children of vertex 5 in the considered BFS tree
buys an edge to vertex 5. Let us call it vertex 6. The other case is when
vertex 5 buys all the edges to its children.
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Consider the following strategy change: vertex 6 deletes an edge towards
vertex 5 and buys new edge towards vertex u. This decreases its distance
cost at least to vertices in S(0) by 4, and to vertices in S(1) by 2, whilst
increases distances to vertices in the set of descendants of 5 in the BFS tree
rooted at 3 by at most 6, to the vertices in S(4) by 4 and to the vertices in
S(3) by two. By this strategy change distance from vertex 6 to any other
vertex is not increased, because vertex u is located deeper than vertex 6
in the BFS tree rooted at vertex 3. But then according to the chain of
inequalities (1) we get 4s0+2s1 > 6k+4s4+2s3, and thus the player 6 can
improve, a contradiction.
In the case where vertex 5 buys all edges towards its children, consider
the following strategy change of vertex 5: delete all the edges to its children
(in the considered BFS tree) and buy one edge to vertex u. By this, the
“SAVINGS” are at least α. Furthermore, since H is biconnected, the graph
remains connected. Distances from vertex 5 are increased only to vertices
in the set K – the set of the vertices which are descendants of vertex 5 in
the BFS tree rooted at vertex 3. This “INCREASE” is at most 2 ·diam(H),
where diam(H) is the diameter of H. By the “SAVINGS” ≤ “INCREASE”
principle, we get that α ≤ 2 · diam(h)k. At the same time, α ≥ (rad(H) −
1)s0, where rad(H) is the radius of H, as otherwise a vertex at distance
rad(H) from vertex 0 could buy an edge towards vertex 0 and decrease its
cost. Combining these two inequalities with the inequality s0 ≥ 8k, which is
obtained from (1), we get that 8(rad(H)−1)k ≤ 2·diam(H)k ≤ 4·rad(H)k,
which is a contradiction.
The second case depicted in Fig. 2(b) is analyzed in the very same way,
the only change is that now the heaviest component is S(u). The chain of
inequalities is similar to (1):
su ≥ s0 + s1 + s2 + s3, s1 ≥ s2 + s3 + s4, s2 ≥ s3 + s4, s3 ≥ s4, s4 ≥ k, (2)
where the notation is the same as in the first case. We obtain that su ≥ 7k,
and subsequently, arguing about the vertex at distance rad(H) from u, the
contradiction 7(rad(H) − 1)k ≤ 2 · diam(H)k ≤ 4rad(H)k.
Finally, if there is a longer sequence of vertices with degree 2 than the
considered sequence of length 5 of edges directed away from u, then we can
only consider the last 5 edges (all directed away from u) and apply the very
same reasoning.

We can strengthen the result if we consider stronger version of a Nash
equilibrium in which no coalition of two players can change their strategies
and improve their overall cost.
We call such an equilibrium a 2-coalitional Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 3 The 3-neighborhood N3(u) of any vertex u of a biconnected com-
ponent H of a 2-coalitional Nash equilibrium has a vertex of degree at least
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Figure 3: The 3-Neighborhood N3(u) of vertex u.
3.
Proof. Assume the converse. Similarly to the proof of Lemma 2, there
are two different cases of how the neighborhood of vertex u looks like (see
Fig. 3(a) and (b); notation is also the same as in Lemma 2). In both cases
consider the coalition of players 0 and 2. Consider the following strategy
changes: player 0 deletes edge (0, 1) and instead buys edge (0, 3), whilst
player 2 deletes edge (2, 3) and buys edge (2, 0). This strategy change does
not change the player coalition’s creation cost (in terms of α). Among the
vertices S(0), S(1), S(2) and S(u) this strategy change decreases coalition’s
usage cost by su+s0+s2 and increases by s1. Other vertices are partitioned
by their shortest distances to vertices 0 and 2, lets assume that for any
vertex v which does not belong to S(0), S(1), S(2) or S(u) shortest distance
to vertex 0 is x and shortest distance to vertex 2 is y. Obviously |x−y| ≤ 2.
If |x− y| > 0 then there is no increase in the usage cost of coalition towards
vertex v by this strategy change. The only possibility of increase is when
x = y, but in that case v is the descendant of vertex 3 in the BFS tree
rooted at vertex 1. Similarly to Lemma 2, we denote k to be the number of
vertices which are descendants of vertex 3 in the BFS tree rooted at vertex
1. Analogously to the proof of Lemma 2, the following inequalities hold for
the case depicted in Fig. 3(a): s0 ≥ s1 + s2, s1 ≥ s2 and s2 ≥ k, whilst for
the case depicted in Fig. 3(b), we have su ≥ s0+ s1+ s2, s1 ≥ s2, s2 ≥ k. In
both cases su + s0 + s2 > s1 + k, which results in a contradiction.

The following two lemmas are crucial for proving the main result of
the paper. The first lemma has been proven in [9]. The second lemma
strengthens a similar lemma from [9]. Its proof uses the result of Theorem 1.
Lemma 4 ([9]) If the t-neighborhood of every vertex of a biconnected com-
ponent H of a Nash equilibrium contains a vertex of degree at least 3, then
the average degree of H is at least 2 + 13t+1 .
Lemma 5 If α > n, then the average degree of a biconnected component H
of a Nash equilibrium graph is at most 2 + 4n
α−n .
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Proof. Among all vertices of the equilibrium graph G, consider a vertex
with the smallest usage cost and let this vertex be v. Consider a BFS tree
T rooted in v. Let T ′ = T ∩H. Then the average degree of H is deg(H) =
2|E(T ′)|+2|E(H)\E(T ′)|
|V (T ′)| ≤ 2+
2|E(H)\E(T ′)|
|V (T ′)| . We now bound |E(H)\E(T
′)|. We
consider vertices that buy an edge in E(H) \E(T ′) and call them shopping
vertices. It is easy to see that no shopping vertex buys more than 1 edge,
because if any of them buys two or more edges, it is better for it to delete all
of the edges and buy 1 new edge towards v: this decreases its creation cost
by at least α, whilst increases its usage cost by at most n. It is thus enough
to bound the number of shopping vertices. For this, we prove that the
distance in the tree T ′ between any two shopping vertices is lower bounded
by α−n
n
, which then implies that there can not be too many shopping vertices.
Namely, the number of shopping vertices is at most 2nV (T
′)
α−n . Assigning every
node from H to the closest shopping vertex according to the distance in T ′
forms a partition of H, where every part contains exactly one shopping
vertex. As the distance in T ′ between shopping vertices is at least α−n
n
, the
size of every part is at least α−n2n .
We assume for contradiction that there is a pair of shopping vertices u1
and u2 such that dT ′(u1, u2) <
α−n
n
. Let u1 = x1, · · · , xk = u2 be the unique
path from u1 to u2 in T
′, and (u1, v1) and (u2, v2) be the edges bought by
u1 and u2 in E(H) \ E(T
′). Observe first that vertices v1 and v2 are not
descendants of any vertex xi, otherwise paths vj−xi and xi−uj together with
an edge (uj , vj) form a cycle of length at most 2(dT ′(u1, u2) + 1) <
2α
n
+ 2
which contradicts Theorem 1. Thus, x0 := v1, x1, . . . , xk, xk+1 := v2 is
a path. Since x1 buys edge (x0, x1) and xk buys edge (xk, xk+1), there
is a vertex xi such that xi buys both of its adjacent edges (xi−1, xi) and
(xi, xi+1). Consider the following strategy change for player xi: delete the
two adjacent edges and buy a new edge to vertex v. In this way xi decreases
its creation cost by α.
We now show that Unew(xi), the usage cost of xi in the new graph, is
less than UG(xi), the usage cost in the original graph, plus α, which gives
a contradiction. It is easy to observe that Unew(xi) ≤ n + Unew(v), since
xi can always go through v in the new strategy to any vertex. We now
consider Unew(v). Note that only the vertices in the path u1 − u2 and their
descendants can increase their distance to v by the strategy change of xi.
Let y be any such vertex. If the closest ancestor of y on the path is xi, then
dnew(v, y) ≤ dG(v, y), so there is no increase. We assume, without loss of gen-
erality, that the closest ancestor (of y) xj has an index less than i, i.e., j < i.
Then the following chain of inequalities and equalities hold: dnew(v, y) ≤
dnew(v, x0) + dnew(x0, xj) + dnew(xj , y) = dG(v, x0) + dG(x0, xj) + dG(xj , y)
(the inequality is a triangle inequality, whilst the equality holds because x0
is not a descendant of any vertex on the path in the new graph). Since
dG(v, y) = dG(v, xj) + dG(xj , y), the difference between new and initial
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distances is dnew(v, y) − dG(v, y) = dG(v, x0) + dG(x0, xj) − dG(v, xj) ≤
2dG(x0, xj) ≤ dG(u1, u2) ≤ 2 · dT ′(u1, u2) ≤
2(α−n)
n
(where the latter in-
equality is implied by our assumption). We need to bound the number of
possible y’s. Path u1 − u2 does not go through vertex v, so the number of
possible y’s is bounded by the size of the subtree of T of a child of v that
contains this path. We prove that the size of any subtree of a child of v in
T ′ is at most n2 .
Consider any child t of v in T , and consider the subtree of T rooted in t.
Let the b be the number of vertices in the subtree, and let a be the number
of other vertices of T . Let c1 be the usage cost of t in the subtree, and let c2
be the usage cost of v (!!) in the other part of the tree T . Then the usage
cost of t in G is upper bounded by c1 + a+ c2, whilst the usage cost of v is
exactly b + c1 + c2. Since v is the vertex with the minimal usage cost, we
have c1 + a+ c2 ≥ b+ c1 + c2. Since a+ b = n, we get that b ≤
n
2 .
Since y was chosen arbitrarily, the increase of the usage cost for v is less
than n2
2(α−n)
n
= α − n, and therefore Unew(v) < UG(v) + α − n which is a
contradiction.

Combining Lemmas 2 and 3 with Lemmas 4 and 5 gives the main result.
Theorem 2 For α ≥ 65n every Nash equilibrium graph is a tree.
Theorem 3 For α ≥ 41n every 2-coalitional Nash equilibrium graph is a
tree.
4 Small cycles and experimental results
In this section we consider equilibrium graphs that have small girth c, and
show that they exist only for small values of α. We start with an observation
that limits the girth of equilibrium graphs containing exactly one cycle.
Proposition 1 Let G be a Nash equilibrium graph containing a k-cycle
C = {v0, v1, . . . , vk−1}, and F the graph where the edges of C are removed
from G. If F consists of k connected components, then k < 6.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that k ≥ 6. For 0 ≤ i < k let
si > 0 denote the number of vertices in the connected component of F
which contains vi. If the edge (v0, vk−1) is bought by the player v0, then she
could replace (v0, vk−1) by (v0, vk−2). By doing this, her creation cost will
remain the same, her distances to sk−3 + sk−2 vertices decrease by 1, but
her distances to sk−1 vertices increase by 1. If the edge (v0, vk−1) is bought
by the player vk−1, this player could replace (vk−1, v0) by (vk−1, v1). By this
change of her strategy, her distances to s0 vertices would increase, but she
could decrease her distances to s1 + s2 vertices.
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Since we consider a Nash equilibrium, we deduce that sk−3 + sk−2 ≤
sk−1 or s0 ≥ s1 + s2. Applying this reasoning for every edge of C, we get
that for every i,
si−3 + si−2 ≥ si−1 or si ≥ si+1 + si+2, (3)
where 0 ≤ i < k (recall that indexes are considered modulo c). The two
inequalities si ≥ si+1+si+2 and si−1+si ≤ si+1 cannot hold simultaneously.
Yet, 3 forces one of the inequalities si−1+si ≤ si+1 and si+2 ≥ si+3+si+4 to
be true, so we have that inequality si ≥ si+1+si+2 implies si+2 ≥ si+3+si+4
for any 0 ≤ i < k. Without loss of generality we can assume that the
edge (vk−1, v0) was bought by v0. Then we get the chain of inequalities
s2i ≥ s2i+1 + s2i+2 for every i, which is obviously a contradiction.

We now describe our computer-aided approach for upper-bounding α
in case of an existence of small cycles in Nash equilibrium graphs. In our
approach, we consider a non-tree Nash equilibrium whose smallest cycle has
a fixed length c, and we construct a linear program asking for a maximum
α, whilst satisfying inequalities of the type “SAVINGS” ≤ “INCREASE”,
which we create by considering various strategy changes of the players of the
cycle. The partition of vertices of a Nash equilibrium graph into vertices
Vd, d ∈ D, gives a variable |Vd| for every d. The number of variables is
t = cc − (c − 1)c. We enumerate over all possible (meaningful) directions
of the edges on the considered cycle, and solve the linear program, which
gives us an upper bounds on α for every direction of edges. The largest such
value is then obviously an upper bound on α for any direction, and thus for
any Nash equilibrium containing a cycle of the fixed size.
The number of all possible directions is equal to 2c, but this number
can be decreased to at most 2c−3 + 2 by simple observations that all hold
without loss of generality. We can assume that the number of right edges is
at least the number of left edges, where an edge (vi, vi+1) is called a right
edge, and (vi+1, vi) is called a left edge. Furthermore, we can also assume
that the edge (v0, v1) is a right edge. If c is even, every considered cycle
can be made (by renaming arguments) to fall into one of the following three
classes: (1) the edges along the cycle alternate between right and left, or (2)
all edges are right edges, or (3) the first two edges are right edges and the
last edge is a left edge. The same holds when c is odd, with the exception
of the alternating edges.
Our linear program contains all inequalities implied by the strategy
changes described in Theorem 1. We furthermore add inequalities for strat-
egy changes of buying one extra edge, and for swapping an edge of the
cycle with a new edge towards an vertex of the cycle. We add the equality∑
d∈D |Vd| = 1 (which expresses the fact that the variables should sum up
to n). Then, the value of a variable |Vd| expresses the fraction of all vertices
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(instead of the absolute number of vertices).
We used the GUROBI linear-programming solver to maximize α for ev-
ery generated linear program. The largest such value thus gives an upper
bound on α for which a cycle of size c can exist. Due to the huge number of
variables, we could not solve the linear program for c > 7, because already
for c = 8, the number of variables was more than 107, while the number
of constraints is Θ(c2). We have made further tweaks to the code, which
allowed us to speed up the computation. We observed that many variables
had the same coefficients in every generated constraint, and thus at most
one such variable is relevant for obtaining the solution of the linear program.
We have considered the variables one by one, and added only those having
unique coefficients in the considered constraints. To check for uniqueness,
we used hashing, as otherwise just creating the matrix of the linear program
was too slow. The obtained compression of the number of variables was
huge: for c = 10, instead of nearly 1010 variables we obtained only around
105.
The obtained upper bounds on α are quite close to n. For girth c ≤ 7, we
obtain α ≤ 1, which corresponds to α ≤ n if we required that
∑
d∈D |Vd| = n
(instead of
∑
d∈D |Vd| = 1). For girth c = 8, α is upper bounded by
191
185 , for
girth c = 9, α is upper bounded by 1312 , whilst for girth c = 10, α is bounded
by 1.2.
We have performed further experiments with larger values of c, but did
not consider all orientations of edges (as this was out of our computational
power). Furthermore, since the number of variables is increasing super-
exponentially, instead of considering all variables, for larger values of c we
have considered only variables |Vd| that have only 0’s and (c − 1)’s as dis-
tances in vector d, that is, we have considered 2c variables. Additionally,
we have taken extra 2c random variables. We have all values of c up to 15.
Upper bounds for α obtained using only these variables are very close to
the real bounds for c ≤ 10 (the difference for k ≤ 10 is between 0 and 0.01).
The largest upper bound of 1.3n on α appears for c = 13, and then only
decreases, which is why we conjecture: the upper-bound of α ≤ 1.3n can be
proved by the considered strategy changes.
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